Why Buyers Don't Walk After the LOI
redactedA deal's structure deepens commitment at the same time diligence is supposed to keep the decision open. The research on that tension, including new evidence from actual acquisitions.
Eleven weeks after the LOI, he gets the quality of earnings report back. EBITDA is lower than he expected. Two add-backs the buyer had counted on don’t hold up. Then, the largest customer renews in four months, and the seller doesn’t want to budge on price at all.
Three months ago, that combination might have killed the deal. But then again, three months ago, he hadn’t paid the lawyers or the quality of earnings firm.
The lender wasn’t already working the file.
Their investors hadn’t heard that this was the one.
Their family hadn’t spent the last eleven weeks hearing about the company they were about to own.
And closing wasn’t just three weeks away.
Somewhere along the way, the question changed. It stopped being should I buy this business? and started becoming how do I get this deal closed?
Nobody announced the change to him. There is no meeting where everyone agrees to stop reconsidering the acquisition. It happens quietly, one week and one bill and one diligence finding at a time.
That is the strange tension built into almost every acquisition. The deeper a buyer goes, the more information they have. They should be getting better at deciding whether to buy. At exactly the same time, walking away is getting that much harder.
There is fifty years of research on why. And now there is evidence from actual acquisitions too.
Your decision is the hardest one to reverse
Barry Staw ran the original experiment inredactedHe gave 240 business students a company with two divisions competing for research money. Some participants made the first investment decision themselves. Others inherited the exact same decision from someone else. Then they learned that the investment had performed badly and had to decide where the next round of money should go.
The people most willing to put more money into the failing division were the people who had chosen it in the first place.
Same company. Same bad result. Different relationship to the original decision.
It was their call.
Staw called the pattern escalation of commitment. His explanation centered on self-justification: reversing course does not just mean accepting that the investment went badly. It can also mean accepting that the original decision was wrong. Putting more in keeps alive the possibility that you were right all along.
An LOI is obviously not the same thing as a laboratory investment decision. But it does put the buyer’s name on the choice. They found this company, chose it over the alternatives, negotiated the price and convinced themselves, and often their partner, investors or lender, that this was the business to pursue.
Then diligence starts. Every fact that arrives afterward is being processed by somebody who has already made the call.
That does not make the buyer irrational. It makes them committed.
Those are not the same thing.
Then the bills start arriving
Nine years after Staw’s experiment, Hal Arkes and Catherine Blumer ran a field experiment at a theater at Ohio University. People buying season tickets were randomly charged either full price or one of two discounted prices. The theater was the same. The season was the same. The performances were the same.
The people who paid full price attended more performances during the first half of the season.
Paying more had not made the plays better. It had made staying home feel more wasteful.
A deal starts building its own pile of season tickets almost immediately: the legal bill, the quality of earnings fee, the deposit, lender costs, flights, weekends, nights rebuilding the model over and over, calls with the seller and a diligence checklist that started at ninety-three items and is finally down to the last twelve items.
None of those costs changes what the business is worth. None improves customer retention, fixes a weak management team or turns a questionable add-back into a real one. But walking away makes all of them feel wasted.
That is the ugly thing about sunk cost. The money is gone either way. Psychologically, it rarely feels that way.
The bad news does not arrive all at once
This may be the part of the research that maps most naturally onto diligence, because deals rarely blow up in one spectacular moment. They slowly leak.
Week two, customer concentration is worse than the CIM suggested. Management explains it.
Week four, one add-back gets cut. Reasonable explanation.
Week six, a lease clause needs work. Probably manageable. Maybe.
Week eight, a key employee may leave after closing. There is a retention plan. Or is there?
Week ten, QoE takes another chunk out of earnings. Maybe structure can solve it. (Can it?)
One finding gets an explanation. Then another finding gets another explanation. Eventually six individually explainable problems can add up to one very different business.
In 2001, Eva Jonas and her co-authors studied what people do after making a preliminary decision and then searching for more information. Participants preferred information that supported the decision they had already made. More interestingly, that tendency was stronger when information arrived sequentially rather than all at once.
The study was not about acquisitions. But diligence is structurally sequential. A buyer almost never receives the customer concentration, payroll issue, landlord problem, QoE adjustment and management risk in one neat package before signing the LOI. They discover them afterward, and each finding is considered while the original decision is still sitting in the room.
That creates a nasty possibility:
Diligence is supposed to update the thesis. But it's a double-edged sword. At the same time, it can quietly become a process for defending it.
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